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The Somalia Affair
The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History
J.L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver

I

n late 1992, the Mulroney
government dispatched the
Canadian Airborne Regiment
(CAR) and, a few months later,
a reconnaissance squadron from
the Royal Canadian Dragoons, to
Somalia to serve in a United Statesrun humanitarian peace enforcement
mission. The east African nation was
a failed state, with warlords fighting
and people starving, and a previous
United Nations (UN) operation had
failed to establish control of the
situation. The new Unified Task
Force was authorized by the United
Nations as a Chapter VII intervention
under the UN Charter that could use
force to restore peace.
In the early 1990s, the Canadian
Forces (CF) had been stretched to the
Abstract: The Somalia Affair was
the military event of the decade.
Horror, mystery, drama, scandal: it
was the perfect headline. The shrill
vindictiveness of critics still fences with
the dull apologias of the establishment
in any reading of the period. We wrote
this entry with both irritants in mind,
our thoughts fixed firmly on human
tragedy and human triumph and how,
in bowdlerizing one, Canadians had
somehow diminished both. Historians
will struggle to wrest Somalia from
the polemicists’ grasp, to temper
pyrotechnics and folk wisdom with
analysis, perspective, or knowledge.
We succumbed here to our own
disappointments, so rhetoric intrudes
– and seems warranted, just the same.

breaking point by budget cuts and
force reductions and a continuing
string of high-profile and dangerous
international security deployments.
In 1992, the CAR, the Canadian
Forces’ quick reaction force, was
the only suitable combat unit not
already deployed, recovering from
a deployment, or preparing for one.
The regiment consisted of three
commandos (equivalent in size and
capability to infantry companies),
one each from the three regular force
infantry regiments.
Stationed in the desert at a dot on
the map called Belet Huen, the CAR
lived in tents in the heat and dust, ate
packaged rations, and tried to restore
order in the midst of chaos. Locals
tried to steal what they could from the
soldiers, and camp security had to be
progressively tightened. There were
many incidents, some shooting, and
several deaths of Somalis until, on
16 March 1993, 2 Commando caught
a Somali teenager red-handed and
took him captive. Two soldiers then
tortured and killed the boy, Shidane
Arone, taking trophy photographs of
the grisly beating. No one intervened,
despite Arone’s repeated screams
and pleas for help and the proximity
of his torture site to surrounding tents
and other positions. Ottawa learned
of the death shortly afterwards,
and there were some punishments
handed out by a CF board of inquiry.
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Little further happened until, in
1994 and 1995, videos made by CAR
soldiers showed racist attitudes and
vile acts during hazing rituals at
Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, the
CAR’s base. The resulting firestorm
of public criticism all but forced
the minister of national defence in
the Chrétien government, David
Collenette, to order the disbandment
of the Canadian Airborne Regiment
on 5 March 1995.
It was only the beginning.
On 20 March, the government
appointed a Commission of Inquiry
into the Deployment of Canadian
Forces to Somalia under Judge
Résumé : L’affaire somalienne a été
l’événement militaire de la décennie.
Horreur, mystère, drame, scandale;
les médias en firent des gros titres.
Le caractère totalement vindicatif des
critiques côtoie toujours les plates
excuses des autorités dans tous les
écrits de l’époque. Nous avons écrit cette
entrée en pensant à ces deux éléments,
notre réflexion fermement ancrée tant
sur la tragédie humaine et que sur le
triomphe de l’être humain, ainsi que sur
le fait que, même en expurgeant l’un, les
Canadiens ont malheureusement réussi
à diminuer les deux. Les historiens
devront se débattre pour retirer l’affaire
somalienne des mains des polémistes,
pour tempérer les feux d’artifice et la
sagesse populaire par l’analyse, du
recul ou des connaissances. Nous avons
succombé ici à nos propres déceptions,
et la rhétorique s’infiltre (et semble
même nécessaire).

59

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 6

A Canadian soldier stands watch in rear hatch of a Grizzly armoured personnel carrier as it patrols through a battle-damaged Somali town.
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Access to Information Act had been
violated as senior officers apparently
tried to protect their reputations
and those of their minister. Did this
represent evidence of systemic failure
of command? One chief of the defence
staff, General Jean Boyle, was forced
to resign as a result of his disastrous
testimony; other senior officers were
tainted. The commission rolled
along, demanding more money, an
expanded mandate, and additional
time.
The government had had
enough. After two years, a tough
and capable Liberal defence minister,
Doug Young, ordered the slowmoving commission to produce its
report promptly and closed it down
in early 1997. The commissioners,
the government’s political
opponents, and some members of
the media cried censorship and

cover-up. Most sensible observers
recognized an inquiry that had
become a headline-hunting fiasco,
its yelps of mistreatment cloaking
the steadily diminishing returns
of an ever-growing mandate. The
resulting five-volume report was
unfortunately, if revealingly, titled
Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the
Somalia Affair. It offered generally
sensible recommendations on
leadership, accountability, discipline,
personnel selection, training, and
rules of engagement. In effect, the
commissioners declared that no
future force should deploy without
proper equipment, training, a
clear chain of command, and a full
understanding of its role. Had any
Canadian expeditionary force ever
marched or sailed with such clarity
of purpose? Complex events and
uncertain outcomes rarely permitted

Photo by Jeff Speed, Canadian War Museum 19940035-018

Gilles Letourneau, Judge Robert
Rutherford, and journalist/academic
Peter Desbarats. The commission
was to examine why the CAR was
chosen for the mission, the events in
Somalia, and the post-deployment
phase that involved an alleged coverup at National Defence Headquarters
after the torture and murder of
Arone had become known. The
chair, Letourneau, was splenetic,
aggressive, and openly dismissive
of many of those called to present
evidence, regularly badgering
witnesses. This made sufficiently
good television fodder that the
commission’s hearings became a
public trial of the Canadian Forces
itself, even though much of the
coverage was devoted to the almost
immaterial alteration of press releases
at National Defence Headquarters.
There was little public doubt that the
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such assurances. It was not the
report’s only broad-brush assertion.
The commission also offered critical
comments on the Somalia mission, on
the cover-up of the torture and murder
and other incidents, and it focused on
12 officers, including seven generals,
pronouncing them “failures.” It made
160 recommendations in all, of which
the government eventually accepted
132. It was a reasonable response to
a long and gruelling investigation
and painful public flogging, rendered
quickly and with government thanks
to still-grumbling ex-commissioners
and a suspicious Canadian public.
Subsidiary research or
investigative reports produced at the
commission’s behest, ranging from a
sociological review of military “tribes”
to an assessment of the mission’s
international security lessons, ran
the gamut from forgettable navel-

gazing to indispensable analysis.
Every expert, it seemed, understood
implicitly the deeper causes of the
Somalia imbroglio, though none – for
reasons that remained nameless – had
proffered wisdom before or during
the ill-fated mission. Pompous reports
on “lessons learned” were more often
than not lists of authors’ favourites,
uncompromised by perspective;
helpful “recommendations”
flowed, unbothered by hypocrisy,
from the military’s fiercest critics.
Everyone purported to have the
answer, and most overlooked the
obvious, Arone’s murder and the
Airborne’s disciplinary misdeeds
notwithstanding: in truth, the
Canadian Forces had performed
superbly. On a difficult mission
marred by international apathy and
local chaos, they had disarmed the
violent, fed the hungry, provided

water to ease thirst, and generated
security to assist daily living in areas
under Canadian military control.
Several individuals were decorated
for acts of uncommon bravery, while
the force as a whole – the airborne,
mechanized units, engineers,
doctors, and helicopter pilots – was
lauded by the campaign’s American
commander (and many Somalis) as
one of outstanding professionalism
and competence, perhaps the best in
the entire international command.
In the short term, such kudos
mattered little. The Somalia mission
became synonymous in public
parlance with the Somalia inquiry that
meant, of course, the Somalia scandal
or, less judgmentally, the Somalia
affair (the title used here). Its result,
aside from the eventual disbandment
of the Canadian Airborne Regiment,
was much greater caution and

Master Corporal Patrick Couture, a member of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, inventories confiscated weapons.
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Top: Two Somali boys photographed through the razor wire which surrounds the
Canadian camp at Belet Huen.
Bottom: A crewman of Grizzly armoured personnel carrier observes a Somali
encampment by the road. Three Somali children wave in the middle of the photo.
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much greater risk aversion among
Canadian Forces personnel and a
fear that Ottawa might not support
independent initiatives on future
missions. The military soon seemed
to believe that advice from the judge
advocate general was a precondition
for any action. There were rules
and regulations for everything,
thick studies to bury all operational
likelihoods in layers of bureaucratic
twaddle, special training on ethics,
accountability, racism, gender
discrimination, and, more helpfully
for impending deployments overseas,
greater attention to local customs,
languages, social attitudes, and living
conditions. Attempts to regulate all
conduct in the field bred hesitancy
and mistrust, failings that showed in
deployments in former Yugoslavia
and elsewhere. Somalia generated
disgust aplenty at the behaviour of
some soldiers and their commanders,
but surprising sophistication in
public attitudes toward the longsuffering military. Opinion surveys
found astonishing support for the
men and women in uniform, and
understandable distaste at how the
Airborne’s now well-publicized
antics before and after the mission
could have been permitted to flourish
and to undermine proud traditions.
Had emphasis on a supposedly
American-style warrior ethic
hijacked sound doctrine and effective
discipline? Had an accumulation
of defence cuts and a careerist high
command ignored basic principles of
management, leadership, and esprit
de corps?
There was more truth in bold
charges than media-shy military
chiefs cared to admit. The Somalia
episode over much of a decade
consumed careers, directorates,
forests of paper, and eons of media
time. Parliamentary inquiries into the
state of the military, and charismatic
leadership of the kind provided by
defence minister Doug Young and
General Rick Hillier (chief of the
defence staff from 2005) gradually
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restored public confidence, military
prospects, and operational efficiency.
The CF culture, unhealthily subsumed
in management, public affairs,
defensiveness, and accountancy,
morphed back toward its warrior
roots, operational competence, and
national service. Its connections to
Canadian values had been far less
generically threatened than the
sordid actions of the few in Somalia
had appeared to indicate, but they
had nevertheless been threatened.
The turn of the century found
such essential bonds emotionally
reinforced and broadly respected. At
the same time, studies of the Canadian
Forces produced for defence minister
Young in 1997 had focused sharply
on the ill education of CF officers,
half of whom (47 percent) had no
university degree and almost none

of whom (only 6.8 percent) had
graduate degrees. This too soon
began to be remedied, with better
education and leadership, public and
political support, and the evident
competence of Canadian units in the
field, at home, and abroad.
The Somalia affair led to
increased scrutiny of the Canadian
Forces. Muckraking books and
articles, denounced regularly by
senior officials, revealed fiddled
expense accounts, the evasion of
responsibility, the cover-up of
misdeeds, and, at times, a moral
climate unsuitable for the CF (or
any public organization) and
unworthy of the country it served.
The Arone murder and the inquiryaffair that followed represented, in
many ways, the nadir of Canada’s
modern military. Recovery, born

of media scrutiny, public interest,
and political attention, was slow
in coming but gradually decisive.
Enlightened leadership and the
overall quality of the rank and file
were instrumental in seeing the
Canadian Forces through and beyond
the pyrotechnics of scandal to the
force that would perform with nearunflagging competence on missions
from Kosovo to Afghanistan.
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The crew of a Canadian Grizzly photographed while on patrol in the Somalian desert near Belet Huen.
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